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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action commenced by Penelko, Inc., 
for damages and injunctive relief as a result of claimed vio-
lation of certain provisions of its lease and for tortious 
interference with its theater business. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered against 
respondent and in favor of appellant in the amount of $65,000. 
The lower court entered its judgment on the verdict in the 
sum of $65,000 and denied appellant's motions for injunctive 
relief and attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Price Rentals, Inc., seeks affirmance of the 
lower court's orders denying appellant's motions for injunc-
tive relief and attorney's fees. 
FACTS 
A. Appellant's Lease And Construction Of Improvements. 
The basic facts of the present case are set forth in the 
brief of Price Rentals, Inc. (Appellant) in Appeal No. 16588 
from the lower court's judgment on the verdict in the present 
case in the sum of $65,000 against Price Rentals, Inc. Of 
particular importance for purposes of this appeal, however, 
is appellant's lease for its theater property, which contains 
the following provisions: 
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There is hereby allotted to the lessee for 
parking, a strip of land 70 feet in width and 234 
feet in depth, running from the South side of the 
above-described parcel to the North side of 9400 
South Street, and an additional tract 40 feet in 
width and 162 feet in depth, from the parcel next 
adjoining the West side of this tract • • • • The 
lessee shall install and maintain at a grade estab-
lished by the lessor and in accordance with the 
standard of the Albertsons parking lot, all paving, 
lighting, curbs and gutterings, si~ewalks and other 
walkways necessary for the possession and use of 
the said premises or required by any governmental 
authority for the use of and access to the same. 
(Emphasis added) (Paragraph 2.) 
All parking facilities, lighting facilities 
and open spaces upon the leased premises are to 
be used in common with other occupants of property 
of the lessor for the maintenance and development 
of a shopping center and no barrier shall be con-
structed or permitted which will bar access to such 
parking facilities and access roads by tenants of 
other premises or their customers or guests. The 
lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining prop-
erty similar covenants and agreements so that the 
lessee shall have similar unobstructed access to 
parking, lighting and other common facilities of 
adjoining tenants. (Emphasis added) (Paragraph 7.) 
It is the intention of the parties that this 
shall be a lease of land only for the purpose of 
construction of buildings or improvements in con-
nection with an integrated shopping center; that 
both of the parties hereto will encourage the 
development of adjoining properties for such pur-
pose. • • (Emphasis added) (Paragraph 8.) 
The preamble to appellant's lease further provides that the 
land leased to appellants would include "parking space and 
access to be set aside and allotted as hereinafter more par-
ticularly described." (Emphasis added) That parking space 
and access area was located between appellant's theater to 
the north and 9400 South to the south. 
-2-
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At the time of execution of said lease and at the time respon-
dent commenced construction of the improvements referred to 
in appellant's complaint, no curbs, gutters, sidewalks or 
traffic control improvements had been constructed along 9400 
South in front of the common parking lot described in appel-
lant's lease. (Pages 1762-1766, 2177-2179.) Similarly, no 
defined access lane existed in the lot. Traffic could enter 
from and gain access to 9400 South along the entire southerly 
boundary of the parking lot. Inasmuch, however, as the par-
ties to the lease knew that Sandy City would soon require 
construction of such improvements in the lot as the shopping 
center was developed, paragraphs 3 and 8 were inserted in 
the lease to provide for the construction of curbs, walkways 
and defined access routes in and along the front of the park-
ing facility. (Pages 1762-1766, 2177-2179.) 
It is also significant that, following the trial, appel-
lant assigned all of its right, title and interest in its 
theater lease and conveyed its interest in the theater build-
ing and improvements. The assignment and conveyance documents 
were recorded June 19, 1980, as Entry Nos. 3444396 and 3444397 
in the Office of the Salt lake County Recorder. 
B. Lower Court Proceedings And Jury Verdict. 
When plaintiff's claims, including alleged trespass re-
sulting from respondent's construction of the above improve-
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ments, were submitted to the jury, the court did not request 
a special verdict from the jury with respect to each of those 
seven claims. Respondent, however, requested the court to 
instruct the jury to return a special verdict for each 
claim of wrongful conduct, including: (1) construction of a 
driveway over the eastern portion of the common parking area, 
(2) construction of landscaping and curb at the entrance to 
the common parking area South, (3) construction of a flagpole 
in the landscaped area, (4) removal of two lights installed 
by Utah Power & Light Company in the common parking area, (5) 
removal of appellant's theater sign from the access way to 
the common parking area, (6) construction of the Perkins' 
Cake & Steak Restaurant, and (7) tortious interference with 
appellant's theater business. (Pages 915-917) Since a spe-
cial verdict form was not submitted by the court, the jury 
returned a general verdict only. (Page 1104.) Contrary to 
appellant's assertions in its brief, the jury did not find 
that respondent had violated appellant's lease by placing 
landscaping at the entrance to the common parking area, by 
constructing a driveway in the common area, by erecting a 
flagpole in the landscaped area, or by constructing the Per-
kins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. (Brief of Appellant, pages 2, 
5 and 6) In fact, the court held, as a matter of law, and 
instructed the jury that respondent did not violate appel-
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lant's lease by constructing the restaurant and that the 
restaurant was not located on appellant's leasehold or the 
common parking area. (Page 1203.) When appellant argued 
at the hearing on its motion for a mandatory injunction that 
such wrongful conduct had occurred, the court considered 
the evidence and denied appellant's motion. 
After the jury had returned its verdict and the court 
had issued its final order denying defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, 
a new trial, appellant filed a motion for assessment of at-
torney's fees. The motion was supported by affidavits of 
counsel, claiming total expenditures and fees in the amount 
of $30,000, although no evidence of attorney's fees had been 
introduced at the trial. (Pages 1245-1247, and 1225-1230) 
On September 11, 1979, the trial court issued a memorandum 
decision denying that motion. (Pages 1649-1659) In its deci-
sion, the court cited the case of Latses v. Nick Floring, Inc., 
99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), in which this Court held 
that a lease covenant pertaining to attorney's fees does not 
run with the land and that a claim for attorney's fees is 
barred by lack of privity between a lessee and an assignee of 
the lessor. The lower court then held that, since a covenant 
to pay attorney's fees is a personal covenant and not a cove-
nant running with the land, respondent, as assignee of appel-
-5-
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lant's lessor, was not liable to appellant for the payment 
of such fees. 
Appellant now seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
orders denying appellant's motions for both injunctive relief 
and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A 
MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE 
QUESTION CONCERNING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS MOOT 
BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS SOLD ITS THEATER AND 
LEASEHOLD PROPERTY. 
A. Appellant's Claim For A Mandatory Injunction Is Moot. 
Injunctive relief snould not be awarded where events 
have rendered such relief unnecessary or ineffectual or where 
the question becomes moot due to changed circumstances that 
occur during the course of a pending action or appeal. Paul 
v. Milk Depots, Inc., 41 Cal.Rptr. 468, 396 P.2d 924, 926-27 
(1964)1 ~also Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corpora-
tion v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446, 448 (1972). If, 
during the course of a pending action, a plaintiff sells the 
property to which the requested injunction pertains, he loses 
his right to such relief. In Mendez v. Bowie, 118 F.2d 435, 
439 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. den. sub nom Rios v. Bowie, 314 
U.S. 639 (1941), the court stated: 
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. The ow~er of the pr~mises, as long as he re-
tains the title'. has an interest in restraining 
the trespass whic~ affects the value of his prop-
~rty. : ... The right of action for an injunction 
is an incident of the ownership of the property. 
The right of action for damages is personal to the 
owner and still remains with him after he has dis-
posed of the property; and when he has ceased to 
be the owner it is all there is left of his cause 
of action, for, as he has no further interest in 
the premises, he has no right to ask for an injunc-
tion •.. and, if he has already begun a suit for 
an injunction and damages .•• he is no longer 
entitled to an injunction because he has ceased to 
be the owner ...• The grantee who has taken title 
to the premises alone has an interest in obtaining 
an injunction. That right belongs to him exclusively. 
Nobody else has any interest in it. 
rt is also the law of this jurisdiction that a mandatory 
injunction, such as that sought by appellant in the present 
action, should be denied where there is little or no benefit 
to the complainant. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 
136, 139 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, appellant is barred from seeking a 
mandatory injunction, compelling removal of the restaurant, 
driveway and curb and landscaping, because it has sold its 
theater building and its rights under the subject ground 
lease. Not only has appellant given up its right to injunc-
tive relief as a result of the sale, but the imposition of a 
mandatory injunction when appellant no longer has any interest 
in the property would confer no benefit on appellant within 
the meaning of Kartchner. Accordingly, the lower court's 
order denying appellant's motion for an injunction should be 
upheld. 
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B. Appellant Has Failed To Show That It Is Entitled 
To A Mandatory Injunction In The Present Action. 
Appellant contends that it is entitled to a mandatory 
injunction as a matter of law because respondent's construc-
tion of the restaurant, curb landscaping, and driveway was 
intentional and that placement of the driveway, curb and land-
scaping in the common parking area was not the result of acci-
dent or innocent mistake. Appellant further states that such 
an injunction should be issued without consideration of the 
equities of the case where a continuing trespass is ruin-
ous or irreparable, or impairs the just enjoyment of the 
subject property. This position, however, is not supported 
by Utah law, nor can it be maintained on appeal since plain-
tiff failed to meet its burden in proving by clear and con-
vincing evidence that respondent's conduct was intentional or 
that the alleged trespasses would be ruinous or irreparable, 
or would impair appellant's just enjoyment of the property. 
In Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, supra at 138, the 
Court stated that a mandatory injunction should be denied 
where the granting of such an injunction would be inconsis-
tent with basic principles of justice and equity, even though 
it is within the scope of relief available in equity courts. 
The Court then observed that, under the facts before it, the 
effect of a mandatory injunction would to be destroy for all 
practical purposes an enclosed carport valued at $2,000.00 
-8-
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and that such relief should never be granted where it might 
operate inequitably or oppressively. Id. at 140. As noted 
above, the Court also emphasized that a mandatory injunction 
should be denied where there is little or no benefit to the 
complainant. Id. at 139. 
The Court's position that equitable factors should be 
considered is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. 
In Hickman v. Sixth Dimension Custom Homes, Inc., 543 P.2d 
1043, 1044 (Ore. 1975), for example, the Court stated that 
mandatory injunctions are not regarded with judicial favor 
and are used only with caution and in cases of great neces-
sity. Such relief, according to the court, depends upon 
broad principles of equity and, clearly, may be denied in 
the court's discretion in accordance with the equities and 
justice of the case. The Court then stated: 
The court may refuse an injunction in cer-
tain cases where the hardship caused to the 
defendant by the injunction would greatly out-
weigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff. 
The injunction does not issue as a matter of abso-
lute or unqualified right but is subject to the 
sound discretion of the Court. Although the autho-
ri tes have not uniformly adopted the comparative 
injury doctrine, we are convinced that it repre-
sents the better rule. Id. at 1045. 
See also, Stuart v. Titus, 400 P.2d 797, 800 (Okla. 1965); 
Borgen v. Wigglesworth, 369 P.2d 360, 363-64 (Kan. 1962); 
Clawson v. Garrison, 3 Kan.App.2d 188, 592 P.2d 117, 128 
(Kan. 1979). 
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The proper standard to be applied in the present case, 
therefore, is whether the hardship caused to respondent by 
the requested injunction would greatly outweigh the benefit 
resulting to appellant or whether it would operate inequit-
ably or oppressively. When the equities in the present case 
are balanced against the rules set forth by this Court, it is 
clear that the granting of a mandatory injunction to a party 
who no longer has any interest in the property would create 
substantial hardship and unnecessary expense without any bene-
fit to appellant. Further, inasmuch as Sandy City expressly 
required construction of the driveway, landscaped area and 
associated cur~ as a traffic control device to regulate traf-
fic to and from the common parking facility, such an injunc-
tion would cause immediate conflict with a requirement im-
posed by a governmental entity that is not a party to the 
present action. It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
court weighed the various burdens and benefits related to 
the imposition of such a drastic remedy and concluded that in 
light of the substantial hardship that would result to respon-
dent, injunctive relief was not appropriate under the circum-
stances. Such a determination would not be an abuse of the 
Court's discretion. 
It will also be noted that plaintiff never requested the 
court to submit to the jury the issue of whether respondent's 
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construction of the subject improvements was intentional, 
whether it would be ruinous or irreparable, or whether it 
would impair the just enjoyment of the property, as appellant 
now argues on appeal. 
In this regard, a party seeking injunctive relief has 
the burden of proving the elements that entitle him to such 
relief. See Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's 
and Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099, 1100 
(1958); E. H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, 16 P.2d 
369, 106 P.2d 1, 3 (1940). The standard of proof necessary 
in cases where injunctions are sought is clear and convincing 
evidence. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., 281 Ore. 
469, 575 P.2d 164, 166 (1978); Borgen v. Wigglesworth, supra 
at 363-64; Clawson v. Garrison, supra at 128. If the court 
is in doubt as to whether injunctive relief is proper, such 
relief should be denied. State v. Reid, 190 Kan. 376, 375 
P.2d 588, 592 (1962); City and County of Denver v. Glendale 
Water and Sanitation District, 380 P.2d 553, 555 (Col. 1963). 
Even under appellant's own theory, if respondent's 
alleged conduct was not intentional, but rather the result of 
accident or innocent mistake, or if the construction of the 
above improvements would not be ruinous or irreparable or 
would not impair the just enjoyment of the property, appel-
lant would not be entitled to a mandatory injunction. Agmar 
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v. Solomon, 87 Cal.App. 127, 261 P. 1029 (1927); Needle v. 
Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 App.2d 334 (1946). In deter-
mining the relief to be granted in the present case, the 
lower court had a clear understanding of the relative merits 
of the claims asserted by the parties. Appellant had not 
requested the court to submit to the jury the questions of 
whether respondent's conduct was intentional or accidental 
or whether the improvements would impair the just enjoyment 
of appellant's property. In fact, there was substantial evi-
dence to the contrary, and the jury returned a verdict denying 
punitive damages, which were instructed to be awarded if 
respondent's conduct was intentional or malicious. 
Paragraph 3 of appellant's lease expressly provided 
that all paving, curbs and gutters and sidewalks would be 
constructed in the future in accordance with the requirements 
of "any governmental authority for the use of or access" to 
the property. Since appellant's leased property was sur-
rounded by vacant land and it was the intention of the par-
ties under paragraph 8 of the lease that an integrated shop-
ping center would be constructed and that the parties would 
encourage the development of adjoining properties for such a 
purpose, it was clear that additional facilities would be 
constructed in the area surrounding appellant's theater, 
all in accordance with Sandy City's requirements. The court 
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may well have concluded, and the denial of injunctive relief 
evidences that the Court did conclude, that respondent's 
construction of improvements adjacent to and along the edge 
of the common parking area was not intentional but was under-
taken in accordance with respondent's understanding and inter-
pretation of the above lease provisions, even assuming that 
the court did consider the issues of intent and irreparable 
injury. Further, when appellant made its motion for injunc-
tive relief, the court was unable to determine from the gene-
ral verdict of the jury whether construction of the driveway, 
curb or landscaped area violated any provisions of appellant's 
lease. In fact, it was impossible to determine whether the 
verdict was based on a violation of the lease provisions 
or whether it was based on tortious interference with appel-
lant's business. In view of such uncertainty and with the 
court's express ruling that construction of the restaurant 
did not violate any provision of appellant's lease, there 
simply was no basis in the record for granting a mandatory 
injunction. The court, therefore, properly denied appel-
lant's motion for an injunction, even assuming for purposes 
of argument that appellant's standard for injuctive relief 
is correct. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN THE PRESENT ACTION. 
A. Plaintiff's Claim For Attorney's Fees Is Barred 
By Lack Of Privity. 
In Latses v. Nick Flooring, Inc., supra, this Court re-
viewed the applicability of an award of attorney's fees in a 
case similar to the present action. As in the present case, 
the lease in Latses provided that the parties to the lease 
agreed to pay all costs and attorney's fees incurred by the 
other in the event of litigation to enforce the covenants of 
the lease. In Latses, the landlord-appellant had purchased 
the subject property and had taken it subject to the tenant-
respondent's lease. In an action for breach of lease, the 
trial court decided in favor of the tenant and awarded him 
attorney's fees in the amount of $500. The landlord took 
exception to the award on the basis that there was no privity 
between him and the tenant and that the covenant for attor-
ney's fees did not run with the land when he purchased it 
from the prior owner. On appeal, the Court held: 
We are of the opinion that appellants are 
correct in their version of this part of the case. 
This was purely a personal covenant as between 
the parties to the contract. Though appellants 
purchased the property subject to the tenancy, 
they did not expressly agree to abide by all the 
terms of the lease. They would be bound only by 
covenants in the lease which affected the estate 
or the interest in the land conveyed or leased. 
Id. at 625. 
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The Court therefore vacated the judgment for attorney's fees. 
The provision for attorney's fees in appellant's lease 
in the present case provides that the successful party in an 
action to enforce the terms of the lease would be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees. However, when appellant's lessors 
leased the shopping center to respondent, the lease stated 
merely that it was "subject to and together with [the) 
Penelko Theater lease"; it did not expressly provide that 
respondent would abide by all of the terms of the lease, 
including the provision for attorney's fees, nor did it con-
tain a provision that all terms would be binding on the as-
signs of the parties. 
Appellant argues in its brief that the sales documents 
in Latses did not provide that the purchase would be sub-
ject to the terms of the lease. (Brief of Appellant, pages 
10, 11). It is a basic principle of property law, however, 
that a purchaser who buys property subject to an outstanding 
lease takes that property subject to the lease, and the Court 
so stated in Latses. Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co., 451 
P.2d 742, 745 (Colo. 1969); Eldredge v. Jensen, 89 Idaho 
243, 404 P.2d 624, 626 (1965). It does not matter whether 
the sales documents so provide. The lease of the shopping 
center property to respondent in the present case merely 
listed the outstanding leases pertaining to the property and 
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accomplished no more or no less than what the law imposed in 
any event. Just as in Latses, the property was taken subject 
to an existing lease, without any provision wherein respon-
dent agreed to be bound by all terms and covenants of the 
lease. Since, as the Court held in Latses, a covenant for 
attorney's fees does not run with the land, appellant should 
not be awarded any attorney's fees in this action. The only 
parties in privity with plaintiff under the lease were the 
initial lessors, and those parties were dismissed out of the 
lawsuit on a motion for a directed verdict upon conclusion of 
the evidence. 
B. Appellant's Claim For Attorney's Fees Is 
Barred For Failure To Introduce Evidence 
Of Attorney's Fees During Trial. 
The amount of attorney's fees to be awarded in an action 
at law is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of 
fact on the basis of proper evidence, just as any other ques-
tion of fact. FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1965). The only exception 
to that rule is when the parties stipulate as to the amount 
or the Court's determination of the amount without submission 
of evidence. See, id., Swain v Salt Lake Real Estate and 
Investment Co., 279 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 1955); Ashworth v 
Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724, 729 (Utah 1951). 
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This Court has held repeatedly that a jury trial should 
be provided to the parties on all issues of fact raised in 
legal causes of action. Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 
P.2d 739, 749 (Utah 1950); Petty v. Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 570 
(Utah 1942). In Petty, for example, the Court considered 
procedures to be used in resolving legal and equitable issues 
raised in the same case and held: 
Where the issues are legal issues, the fact 
that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry 
into effect the judgment based upon the legal is-
sues, is not sufficient to deprive either party 
of his right to have the legal issues submitted 
to a jury. 
The Court also held that a claim by a plaintiff to recover 
money owing under a contract is clearly an issue of fact 
which must be submitted to the jury, as is a claim for attor-
ney's fees. FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra 
at 673-74. Instruction Number 90.50 of the Jury Instructions 
For Utah, as approved by a committee consisting of judges and 
practicing attorneys who devoted long hours of work to com-
pile a set of jury instructions upon which counsel could rely, 
instructs the jury to fix reasonable attorney's fees where 
such fees are provided for by contract or statute. This 
instruction reflects the opinion of the judges and lawyers 
serving on the committee that the question of reasonable at-
torney's fees is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury 
where the jury sits as a trier of fact, and not the judge 
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presiding over the trial. This instruction and the rules set 
forth above, of course, do not apply to cases tried under Utah 
Code Annotated §§34-27-1, 38-1-18, 78-11-10 and 78-37-9. The 
present case, however, does not fall within the above statu-
tory provisions, and respondent's right to a jury trial on 
the issue of attorney's fees, as well as all issues of fact, 
"should be scrupulously safeguarded." See Abdulkadir v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 318 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1957). 
In FMA Financial Corporation, supra at 673, the Court 
also held that it is "fundamental that a judgment must be 
based upon the evidence before the court." The Court further 
stated that the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees was an 
issue of fact which would require a proper evidentiary basis: 
Thus it was part of the plaintiff's case to 
which it had the burden of proving. Failing to 
offer proof of any character on this issue had 
the same effect as would the failure to offer 
proof as to any other controverted issue. There 
is nothing upon which to base a finding. The defen-
dants' objection that the finding as to attorney's 
fees is not supported by any evidence is well 
taken • • • • Id. at 674. 
Similarly, in Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 
1971), the Court reiterated that it had held on numerous 
occasions that attorney's fees cannot be allowed unless there 
is evidence to support them. 
The position of this Court with respect to the issue of 
attorney's fees is consistent with that of other jurisdic-
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tions. In Crouch v. Pixler, 320 P.2d 943 (Ariz. 1958), for 
example, the Supreme Court of Arizona considered whether 
the question of attorney's fees should be submitted to the 
jury and whether an award of attorney's fees should be based 
upon the evidence. The Court cited the Utah case of Mason v. 
Mason, 160 P.2d 730 (Utah 1945), and stated that courts gener-
ally hold that, to justify a finding of reasonable attorney's 
fees, there must be evidence in support of such a finding. 
The Court, therefore, refused to award attorney's fees to 
the plaintiff, stating: 
The issue as to reasonable attorney's fees 
was not submitted to the jury, and no evidence 
was adduced as to the services rendered by the 
attorney for the reasonable value thereof. 320 
P.2d at 946. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Waggoner v. Oregon Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, 526 P.2d 578, 582 (Ore. 1974), 
also stated: 
It has long been settled in Oregon that the 
amount of attorney fees to be allowed in both an 
action at law and a suit in equity is a question 
of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts 
upon pleading and evidence in the same manner as 
any other question of fact, unless the parties 
stipulate that the court may fix the attorney fees 
without hearing evidence on that issue. 
Therefore, unless an award of attorney's fees in a jury trial 
is based upon evidence submitted to the jury, a contracting 
party is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
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In the present case, appellant submitted a proposed 
instruction, patterned after the JIFU instruction regarding 
attorney's fees, to the court for submission to the jury. At 
no time during the trial, however, did appellant introduce 
any evidence relating to the amount of work devoted to the 
case by appellant's attorneys or the value of that work. 
Appellant considered this to be a jury issue at the time 
of submittal of its proposed instructions to the court, and 
even took exception to the court's refusal to submit its 
attorney's fee instruction to the jury. (Page 2529) When 
respondent opposed appellant's motion for attorney's fees 
and raised before the lower court the arguments set forth 
above, appellant did not argue, either in its brief or at 
the hearing, that the court had written on its proposed 
instruction "denied -- to be determined by the court". (See 
page 1653) Instead, for the first time in this action and 
for the convenience of argument, appellant takes a contrary 
position, stating that it relied on the court's apparent 
position, as reflected by the above notation, that the court 
would determine the attorney's fees, when neither party to 
this action knew of the court's position until after the 
court issued its memorandum decision nearly four months after 
the jury had rendered its verdict. (See affidavits of coun-
sel for respondent [Pages 1667-68 and 1671-762), stating that 
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the question of who should set the amount of attorney's fees 
was never raised during the trial or in chambers and that 
counsel did not become aware of the court's position that it 
would fix attorney's fees, until September 1979, when they 
received the court's memorandum decision. Counsel for appel-
lant filed no opposing affidavits.) 
C. Appellant's Claim of Attorney's Fees Cannot Be 
Sustained Because It Is Impossible To Determine 
Whether The Verdict Was Based Upon Tortious 
Conduct Or Breach of Lease. 
As a general rule and in the absence of any contractual 
or statutory provision therefor, attorney's fees incurred by 
the plaintiff in litigation are not recoverable as an item of 
damages, either in a contract or a tort action. Holland v. 
Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 80 (Utah 1964); Erisman v. Overman, 358 
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1961); 22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages §165. In the 
present case, plaintiff set forth two basic causes of action. 
First, appellant alleged that respondent had violated cer-
tain provisions of its lease, and second, that respondent had 
entered into a willful and malicious course of conduct designed 
to destroy plaintiff's business and force abandonment by 
plaintiff of its theater and lease. The first of appellant's 
claims is therefore based upon a lease, which contained a 
provision regarding attorney's fees, while the second cause 
of action is based upon a tort for which attorney's fees are 
not permitted under Utah law. Both issues were submitted by 
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the court to the jury without use of a special verdict form, 
although respondent submitted a special verdict which would 
have required the jury to specify the claims upon which the 
verdict was based. Consequently, when the jury returned its 
verdict in the present case, it could not be determined whe-
ther the verdict was based upon breach of contract or tortious 
injury to appellant's business. Appellant, therefore, is not 
entitled to recover attorney's fees. To have asked the 
court to indulge in speculation as to the basis upon which 
the verdict was rendered would have clearly been erroneous. 
D. The Lower Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider 
Appellant's Motion For Attorney's Fees Because 
The Court's Order of July 2, 1979, Became Final, 
And Both Parties Filed Notices of Appeal Before 
The Motion Was Heard By The Court. 
Upon conclusion of the trial in the present case, the 
Court reserved for a future determination only the issue 
of injunctive relief. That issue was resolved by way of 
a subsequent motion, which was heard by the Court on June 
27, 1979. On or about July 2, 1979, the Court entered its 
order denying appellant's motion for injunctive relief and 
respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
or in the alternative, a new trial. No other motions were 
made by any of the parties to this action following the trial 
and prior to issuance of the July 2, 1979, order. Accordingly, 
the court's order denying the respective post-trial motions 
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of the parties became final within the meaning of Rule 72(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the time for filing 
an appeal from this final order began to run in accordance 
with Rule 73(a). 
On July 9, 1979, however, appellant filed its motion 
for attorney's fees. Before that motion was heard by the 
court, both respondent and appellant filed timely notices 
of appeal and designations of record on appeal. However, 
appellant did not call to the court's attention the issue 
of attorney's fees prior to the conclusion of the trial, 
nor did it make any effort to reserve the issue of attorney's 
fees for a later determination by the court. 
In the absence of a judgment reciting that the court 
would retain jurisdiction over the issue of attorney's fees 
until a later proceeding, the court's judgment became final 
on July 2, 1979. See Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 Utah 2d 120, 
405 P.2d 342, 343 (1965). Appellant did not make any post-
trial motions to alter or amend the judgment in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it make 
any motion to toll the running of the time for appeal. 
Further, even if appellant's motion for attorney's fees 
were properly filed, plaintiff subsequently abandoned that 
motion by filing its notice of appeal. See 4 Am.Jur.2d, 
Appeal and Error, §306-307. In this regard, it should be 
noted that Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
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vides, if any additional claims remain to be determined by the 
trial court prior to appeal, a party to an action may file a no-
tice preserving his right to appeal on the decided issue until a 
final determination is made of any remaining claims. Appellant 
did not file such a notice in the present case and thereby 
waived its right to have any further post-trial motions consi-
dered by the court. Accordingly, when both parties filed their 
notices of appeal from the court's final order of July 2, 1979, 
jurisdiction over the case became vested in the Utah Supreme 
Court and appellant lost any right to seek attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion for injunctive relief. Furthermore, 
appellant sold all of its interest in the leased property and 
no longer has a claim for such relief. The court also prop-
erly denied appellant's motion for attorney's fees for the 
reasons stated above. Both rulings should now be sustained 
on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of eptember, 1980. 
, CHRISTENS N & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. 
By~~~~~~~~,,,.....--~,J-
Rex E. Madsen 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the fore-
going Respondent's Brief by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
respectively to William H. Henderson, 431 South 300 East, 
Suite 208, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Mark S. Miner, 
Newhouse Building, Suite 525, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Dated this 25c/ft. day of September, 1980. 
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